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Neurointerventions, Crime, and
Punishment: Ethical Considerations
by Jesper Ryberg1
FIONA SARAZIN2
A UNIQUE HALLMARK OF CRIMINAL LAW is that it concerns itself with the moral

culpability of offenders.3 Penal theory has long purported to align with the
prevalent orthodoxies of criminology, which have been increasingly informed by
cognitive science. Recent advancements in brain imaging and neuroscience have
revealed a growing ability to target structural and functional impairments that
predispose psychopathy and violent tendencies.4 Neurointerventions, Crime, and
Punishment delineates the ethical objections to the use of brain interventions,
or “neurointerventions” (NIs) on offenders within a criminal justice framework
for the purpose of crime prevention.5 NIs encompass a variety of methods that
affect the conative, affective, or cognitive aspects of the mind.6 The author,
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

Jesper Ryberg, Neurointerventions, Crime, and Punishment (Oxford University Press, 2019).
J.D. Candidate (2021), Osgoode Hall Law School; B.Sc. Microbiology & Immunology,
McGill University.
Paul H Robinson, “The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert” (1996)
76 BUL Rev 201.
See e.g. Hannah L Bedard, “The Potential for Bioprediction in Criminal Law” (2017)
18 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 268; Yaling Yang, Andrea L Glenn & Adrian Raine, “Brain
abnormalities in antisocial individuals: implications for the law” (2008) 26 Behavioral
Sciences & L 65; Kent A Kiehl & Morris B Hoffman, “The Criminal Psychopath: History,
Neuroscience, Treatment, and Economics” (2011) 51 Jurimetrics 355.
Ryberg, supra note 1 at 1.
Ibid at 9.

500

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Jesper Ryberg, approaches the subject matter from a background in criminal
justice ethics and neuroethics. As a professor of Ethics and Philosophy of Law at
Roskilde University in Denmark, he has made an impressive contribution to the
recent literature in the fields of penal theory, ethics, and neuroscience.7
In his book, Ryberg questions the circumstances under which it may be
ethically permissible to offer targeted NI to offenders in exchange for a reduced
sentence, or even to impose NI as a form of punishment. This proposed treatment
would target offenders that are likely to re-offend seeking to pacify certain mental
traits that are linked to recidivism. The book represents an addition to a growing
discourse focused criminal law’s “renewed infatuation” with neuroscience.8
It is divided into seven chapters, but the overall discussion is oriented toward
answering the following question: whether offering crime-preventative NI to
offenders in exchange for a reduction of their punishment is ethically justifiable
from a theoretical perspective (i.e., within an idealized penal system), and whether
the same arguments would pass muster in an imperfect criminal justice system.
Ryberg begins by addressing the legitimacy of offering the option of NI
to offenders by evaluating whether or not it would vitiate the principle of
informed consent.9 He finds that it would not be coercive to give this option,
as it would constitute an offer rather than a threat.10 However, this assumes
that valid consent is required for the exchange of NI for leniency to be morally
acceptable.11 If the importance of consent reflects the significance of autonomy,
then crime-preventative NI may be morally acceptable despite vitiating
consent.12 Ryberg contends that this is because NI as a medical treatment would
benefit society through crime reduction, analogous to the societal benefits of
mandatory vaccination of infants. Further, Ryberg argues, the effects of NI on
the offender may even enhance autonomy, if the purpose of the NI is to improve
impulse control.13
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See e.g. Jesper Ryberg, “Proportionality and the Seriousness of Crimes” in Michael Tonry,
ed, Of One-eyed and Toothless Miscreants: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime? (Oxford
University Press, 2019); Jesper Ryberg, “Neuroethics and Brain Privacy” (2017) 23 Res
Publica 153; Jesper Ryberg, “Neuroscientific Treatment of Criminals and Penal Theory”
in David Birks & Thomas Douglas, eds, Treatment for Crime: Philosophical Essays on
Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2018) 177.
See Amanda C Pustilnik, “Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal
Law” (2009) 44 Wake Forest L Rev 183 at 185.
Ryberg, supra note 1 at 26.
Ibid at 32.
Ibid at 35.
Ibid at 36.
Ibid at 37.
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This view is among the more conservative in a polarized debate with respect
to the requirements for administration of NIs to offenders. Many have argued
that doing so would only be permissible under certain conditions: for example,
where there is a lack of coercion, informed consent, or voluntariness on the part
of the offender.14 While this seems to be the prevailing view, other scholars have
echoed the argument that offering NI in return for leniency is not coercive,
and accordingly, does not undermine autonomy.15 Regardless, challenging the
requirement of consent altogether is a highly controversial stance.16
Ryberg goes on to argue that, even if consent need not be obtained, the use of
NIs on offenders may still be morally unacceptable if it is exploitative or outside
the ambit of appropriate state action.17 He describes wrongful exploitation as
taking advantage of another party in dire circumstances, where unfairness can
arise—either in the process or outcome of a transaction.18 Ryberg concludes that
NIs are not exploitative, finding a lack of unfair advantage, but does not come to a
conclusion with respect to the administration of NIs by the state.19 Nevertheless,
he finds the use of NIs to be justifiable by analogizing them with existing forms of
punishment.20 In other words, Ryberg questions the requirement of consent for
the use of NIs on offenders by pointing out that incarceration as a punishment
does not require consent. This is not an uncommon line of reasoning for
justifying the use of NIs within criminal justice systems. The comparison between
directly intervening with the brains of offenders (i.e., through NIs) and indirect
intervention through punishment, rehabilitation, parole conditions, et cetera,
has been made by other proponents of NI.21
Having found it ethically acceptable to offer NIs to an offenders in return for
leniency, Ryberg explores the ethical considerations surrounding the compulsory

14. See e.g. Henry T Greely, “Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility
but Treatment” (2008) 56 U Kan L Rev 1103 at 1134; Thomas Douglas, “Criminal
Rehabilitation Through Medical Intervention: Moral Liability and the Right to Bodily
Integrity” (2014) 18 J Ethics 101 at 103; Kari A Vanderzyl, “Castration as an Alternative to
Incarceration: An Impotent Approach to the Punishment of Sex Offenders” (1994) 15 N III
UL Rev 107 at 140.
15. See e.g. A Wertheimer & FG Miller, “There Are (STILL) No coercive Offers” (2013) 40 J
Medical Ethics 592.
16. Douglas, supra note 14 at 104.
17. Ryberg, supra note 1 at 39.
18. Ibid at 39-41.
19. Ibid at 42-43, 47.
20. Ibid at 49.
21. See Greely, supra note 14; Douglas, supra note 14.
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administration of NI to offenders as a form of moral bioenhancement.22
He addresses the objections that moral bioenhancement presupposes a standard
acceptable moral disposition (i.e., a moral “yardstick”);23 that it would prevent
offenders from being able to choose between right and wrong;24 and that it would
fundamentally change an offender’s identity.25 In refuting these points, Ryberg
again relies on parallels with incarceration as a form of punishment, and questions
the general implications of the use of (and need for) a moral “yardstick.”26 This
position is more radical, and is generally met with disagreement.27 Proponents of
Ryberg’s view have analogized the use of compulsory NI to mandatory medical
intervention for the purpose of infectious disease control.28 Critics, on the other
hand, raise the concern of potential governmental misuse of such interference
with the minds of offenders.29
The second question Ryberg addresses is whether compulsory NIs intrude
on bodily integrity, and if so, whether that makes NI morally unacceptable.30
Ryberg argues for a threshold position where the right to bodily integrity can
be overruled where enough is at stake.31 Again, by analogy, he justifies the
use of non-surgical intrusions on bodily integrity by comparing NIs to other
compulsory medical violations of offenders’ bodily integrity, such as drawing
blood.32 Ryberg’s reasoning on the topic of bodily integrity closely follows that
of Thomas Douglas, some five years earlier.33 Douglas also compares the moral
permissibility of administering non-consensual NIs on offenders with the lack
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Ryberg, supra note 1 at 53.
Ibid at 57.
Ibid at 61.
Ibid at 69.
Ibid at 59, 62, 65, 73.
See e.g. Elizabeth Shaw, “The Right to Bodily Integrity and the Rehabilitation of Offenders
through Medical Interventions: A Reply to Thomas Douglas” (2019) 12 Neuroethics 97;
Charlotte Kouo, “The Prospects of Introducing Neurochemical Intervention in Crime
Policy” (2018) 6 Leg Issues J 33; David Birks & Alena Buyx, “Punishing Intentions and
Neurointerventions” 9 AJOB Neuroscience 133; Stephen J Morse, “Neuroscience, Free will,
and Criminal Responsibility” in Walter Glannon, ed, Free will and the brain: Neuroscientific,
philosophical, and legal perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 251.
Jonathan Pugh & Thomas Douglas, “Justification for Non-Consensual Medical Intervention:
From Infectious Disease Control to Criminal Rehabilitation” (2016) 35 Crim Justice
Ethics 205 at 206.
See Kouo, supra note 27 at 40.
Ryberg, supra note 1 at 75.
Ibid at 80.
Ibid at 81-82.
Douglas, supra note 14 at 107.
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of consent generally required for punishment within criminal justice systems.34
He argues that, in committing crimes, offenders may become liable to some
forms of what he terms “medical correctives.”35 Douglas and Ryberg’s works are
in conversation with one another, with Douglas choosing to refute the consent
requirement by appealing to how the right to bodily integrity applies to offenders
in the criminal justice context.36
Physical integrity, however, does not encompass the right to mental noninterference, which ostensibly protects offenders from forcible mind-alteration.
Nevertheless, Ryberg concludes that such a right is either so broad as to be
incompatible with existing types of punishment, or so narrow that it is not
infringed by the administration of compulsory NI on offenders.37 Interestingly,
Ryberg does not consider how medical interventions are used to affect the minds
of offenders in other contexts, such as with drug addiction or mental illness.38
For instance, in Canada, the Criminal Code permits sentencing judges to include
optional conditions to a sentence, such as attending a treatment program.39
Alternatively, in the United States, participation in drug treatment programs
may be a required condition of probation or parole.40 The United States has
also implemented a scheme for administering mandatory NIs to mentally ill
offenders, provided the treatment is in the offender’s medical interest and the
offender poses a danger to themself or those around them.41
Having defended the concept of compulsory NI, Ryberg invites the reader
to reconsider the use of NI on offenders, not in lieu of punishment, but as a
punishment itself.42 He lays out the four pillars of punishment: imposing harm
upon an offender;43 providing retribution for illegal conduct;44 imposing the
authority of the state to punish;45 and symbolizing reprobation.46 Ryberg easily
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Ibid at 105.
Ibid.
Ibid. See also Pugh & Douglas, supra note 28.
Ryberg, supra note 1 at 92.
See e.g. Greely, supra note 14; Donna L Hall, Richard P Miraglia & Li-Wen G Lee, “The
Increasingly Blurred Line between Mad and Bad: Treating Personality Disorders in the Prison
Setting” (2010) 74 Alta L Rev 1277.
RSC 1985, c C-46, s 742.3(2)(e).
Greely, supra note 14 at 1108.
Ibid at 1109.
Ryberg, supra note 1 at 95.
Ibid at 101.
Ibid at 102.
Ibid at 103.
Ibid at 104.

504

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

finds that the imposition of NI on offenders satisfies these requirements, and
therefore NI might theoretically serve as a form of punishment.47
But in order to properly function as punishment, it must be a justified
punishment.48 Such punishments must meet additional penal theoretical
requirements: encouraging inclusion and reintegration;49 drawing attention to
the nature of the crime and its consequences;50 facilitating remorse;51 engaging the
rational capacities of the offender;52 and creating a proportional punishment.53
Ryberg argues that, as a method of cognitive rehabilitative therapy, NIs can
improve cognitive abilities and thus satisfy the first four requirements. When
it comes to proportionality, Ryberg emphasizes that, in order to satisfy this,
NI should be comparable in severity to other punishments.54
There are also characteristics that punishments must not possess in order to be
morally acceptable in principle.55 These include: punishments that treat people
as an instrument (i.e., as means to an end);56 punishments that are degrading,
humiliating, or violate human dignity;57 punishments that destroy or prevent
the offender from exercising their rational capacity;58 and punishments that
portray offenders as sub-human.59 Ryberg’s approach to his analysis within this
framework is consistent: he finds no clear evidence that certainly places the use
of NIs on offenders into any of these categories of unacceptable punishment.60
Ryberg also considers whether it would be morally legitimate for physicians
to use their medical expertise to administer NIs to offenders.61 An objection
could be raised based on the moral significance of: the Hippocratic Oath; the
physician-patient relationship; and the general trust we place in physicians.62
First, Ryberg argues that crime-preventative NIs do not violate the Hippocratic
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Ibid at 106.
Ibid at 107.
Ibid.
Ibid at 110.
Ibid at 113.
Ibid at 115-116.
Ibid at 118.
Ibid at 119.
Ibid at 120.
Ibid at 123.
Ibid at 124.
Ibid at 127.
Ibid at 129.
Ibid at 132.
Ibid at 137.
Ibid at 138.
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Oath because: physicians regularly act in ways that do not involve healing or
preventing harm;63 physicians should engage in functions with morally desirable
outcomes;64 and many clinical treatments actually necessitate some harm.65
Ryberg pre-empts objections based on the special responsibility of physicians to
patients by asserting that there are morally acceptable occasions which require
physicians to act outside the interests of their patients,66 or even in the interests of
the state (e.g., quarantining patients to prevent an infectious outbreak).67 Finally,
he argues against a trust-based objection by comparing the administration of NIs
with physician participation in the death penalty, for which there is no empirical
evidence of an adverse effect on the public’s trust in physicians.68
The final question considered is whether historical abuses of offenders
constitute an objection to the introduction of NIs within contemporary criminal
justice schemes.69 Ryberg characterizes this argument by borrowing from Emily
McTernan’s principle of “pessimist induction,” which amounts to an adverse
presumption informed by prior unethical behaviour.70 Ryberg finds that, in order
for this to constitute a valid objection, the pessimist induction principle requires
specificity in scope. Even then, he argues, it is unclear whether or not an adverse
inductive inference is morally acceptable reasoning.71 The principle itself is flawed
by a lack of counter-examples of historical successes, rather than just the mistakes
made in wrongfully administering NIs.72 Ultimately, Ryberg concludes that past
misuses of NIs should not bar future use, so long as this medical history remains
relevant as a cautionary tale.73
In the seventh and final chapter, Ryberg gives a long-awaited disclaimer: that
the ethical arguments advanced up until this point presuppose a criminal justice
system that conforms to theoretical ideals.74 He acknowledges the significant
discrepancy between penal theory and penal practice, notably resulting in

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Ibid at 146.
Ibid at 147.
Ibid.
Ibid at 152.
Ibid at 152-153.
Ibid at 157.
Ibid at 166-167.
Ibid at 172.
Ibid at 173-177.
Ibid at 180.
Ibid at 185.
Ibid at 187.
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phenomena such as mass incarceration, increasing rates of imprisonment, and
over-punishment.75
Ryberg goes on to re-evaluate the objections discussed in the previous
chapters through the lens of a non-ideal criminal justice system.76 First, on the
issue of coercion, he finds that in a system where the baseline punishment is not
morally justifiable, offering NI in exchange for leniency would indeed constitute
coercion.77 Secondly, Ryberg’s view of compulsion is that, in existing criminal
systems where prediction of recidivism is unreliable, and inefficient punishment
schemes are implemented, it would be reckless for NIs to be administered as a
compulsory treatment.78 Ryberg then reconsiders the administration of NIs as
punishment. He argues that since current penal systems do not practically meet
theoretical punishment requirements, NIs should not be imposed for fear that
they will not be implemented consistently in light of these criteria.79 Finally,
Ryberg returns to the objection of physician participation. Objections based
on the Hippocratic Oath and the physician-patient relationship, he argues,
no longer hold water given the unreliability of recidivism rates and the potential
for incorrect or harmful administration of NIs.80
The idea that Ryberg’s arguments are valid only with the presupposition
of ideal penal theory both undercuts his position and reinforces the pattern of
reasoning by analogy in this text. Certainly, in an ideal penal system, it would
be valid to justify concessions (e.g., to consent, autonomy, bodily integrity,
et cetera) by appealing to how parallel concessions were successfully made within
the same framework. The use of incarceration is generally legitimized in the
face of human rights concerns as a means to protect society from criminals.81
While the goal of crime reduction by means of NI flows from this concept, the
justification of encroachment upon offenders’ rights needs to do more than
borrow from adjacent policy objectives. Further, it has been argued that the idea
of “pre-empting” criminality with NIs contradicts the value of due process, as the
existing model of criminal justice is designed to respond to crime.82 To employ
NIs in this way would, in essence, use factors that are outside the conscious

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Ibid at 189-190.
Ibid at 195.
Ibid at 197.
Ibid at 205.
Ibid at 206.
Ibid at 209.
Kouo, supra note 27 at 41.
Ibid at 40.
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control of offenders to discriminate between them.83 This would certainly raise
additional ethical questions.
At the time of writing, it is still unclear whether the bourgeoning field of
neurocriminology should prove to be so legitimate as to allow NIs to become
part of penal policy.84 There is a diverse plurality of neuroethical perspectives and
approaches to modern cognitive science, the more radical of which will likely
never see the inside of a prison.85 Some authors have even expressed concerns
related to the ethical considerations surrounding the development of safe and
effective NI treatments.86 For example, animal models may not suffice for testing
cutting-edge therapies, and there would be significant hurdles—both practical
and ethical—to conducting clinical trials with humans.
Overall, Neurointerventions, Crime, and Punishment is an important foray
into the ethics of incorporating NIs into penal policy. Ryberg openly addresses
seemingly unsavoury questions and brings a complex history of crime and
punishment up to date with contemporary moral theory and cognitive science
initiatives. With this text, Ryberg expands upon his previous contributions by
offering an in-depth, dispassionate defence of NI in lieu of punishment (and as
punishment). This book is a key contribution to the conversation surrounding
medical ethics. In furthering this discourse, Ryberg makes palatable even the
most radical components of the debate. This book will likely encourage further
research and facilitate a more nuanced engagement with this issue among experts.

83. Bedard, supra note 4 at 320.
84. Kouo, supra note 27 at 43.
85. Matthias Mahlmann, “Ethics, Law and the Challenge of Cognitive Science” (2007) 8
German LJ 577 at 577.
86. Greely, supra note 14 at 1121.

